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maison before he left the capital he and she had jointly made so beautiful and gay.

The return from Elba, dwelling upon the personal side of the story, is excellently narrated; and the drama at Laffray, when Napoleon advanced alone to meet the regiment that had been sent to arrest or kill him, is picturesque. "Surely, this is one of the great scenes of history!" exclaims our author.

Next come the chapters on the Waterloo campaign, rich in annals of British pluck. Then follow those describing the emperor's bearing while awaiting the decision of his captors as to his own future. England was the most exacerbated of the powers. In a leader of July 25, the *Times* called Napoleon a savage deserving the gallows.

The volume is well manufactured, and but for some errors in proof-reading (such as *Hassau* for *Hanau*, *Soignies*—the forest of—for *Soignes*, and *Marmont* for *Murat* in one place), no fault can be found with it. It is illustrated with eleven good phototypes. The battles merely hinted at need no maps. The Hundred Days would be better for a map of the celebrated triangle and one of Waterloo. Some of the translated quotations are only partial, without stars to show the gaps. These stars seem essential. Their absence sometimes affects the meaning.

Taken as a study of the politics of these stirring months, and as a sketch of by far the strongest actor in the momentous drama, the work can be highly commended. It is one that the worshippers of Napoleon will welcome.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia, 1806. By F. LORAIN PETRE.

With an Introduction by Field Marshal Earl ROBERTS, V.C., K.G., etc. (London and New York: John Lane Company. 1907. Pp. xxiii, 319.)

As Bonaparte's advance against Austria in 1797 was a part of his campaign of 1796, so were the Pultusk-Eylau-Friedland manoeuvres properly the continuation of the Jena operation, and Mr. Petre's recently reviewed book on the campaign in Poland was in a sense incomplete without the present volume to precede it. As Lord Roberts points out, the study of military history is growing among English-speaking peoples, and we welcome any exhaustive study of a notable campaign, even in this year of the Peace Congress. In his introduction Lord Roberts preaches mainly from the text of unpreparedness, the common failing of America as well as England—and his few words may well be heeded. The work is recommended "particularly to statesmen, on whose shoulders rests the responsibility of power".

The volume is easy to read. To a student already familiar with 1806, there are fewer causes of dissent than are usual. Mr. Petre sketches out the political as well as the military status: Prussia's neu-

trality from 1795 to 1805; her growing arrogance until Austerlitz suddenly humbled her tone; Napoleon's heaping diplomatic insult after insult upon her, while outwitting her in statecraft; her turning upon the conqueror of Austria with demands equally insulting; her false reliance on her really outworn military system—although even Napoleon respected it: “*il y aura de la terre à remuer*”, said he; her utter failure to comprehend the methods of the new master of war.

At first blush, Napoleon's task appeared to be no sinecure: he was still at war with Russia; he was not certain Austria would not again rise, if she had the chance; and he needed the army of 1805. This has been called the best he ever commanded, and by 1806 it had been hardened by marching and fighting and strengthened morally by victory. The Prussian army was based on pipe-clay and ramrod discipline—the skeleton of Frederick's system without the soul, without the king's amazing capacity to do the fit thing. But its leaders knew not its weakness, had learned no lessons from Rivoli or Marengo. They deemed the army that Vater Fritz had trained invincible, as indeed it would have been against the same class of enemy as of yore; and they had no conception of the speed or certainty with which Napoleon could manoeuvre, nor of the momentum of his blow. While the French lived on the country and the soldier carried four days' rations in his haversack, the Prussians were delayed by feeding from their magazines. The French foot had the best, the Prussian the worst musket in Europe; in cavalry alone were they their enemy's equal. The French had the new division and corps organization—each body being complete and sufficient in itself; every Prussian brigade was controlled from headquarters. Napoleon could treat his divisions or corps as units; the Prussians' regiments were administrative but not fighting units. Napoleon's one order moved a corps of 20,000 men; the Prussians issued a score of orders for the same purpose. The emperor sent his instructions to his lieutenants, who remained with their commands; the Prussian generals were summoned to headquarters to receive them. Napoleon's one will was decisive; never ending councils of war delayed the Prussians. One army was perfected in the discipline of the march and battle, however prone to pillaging; the other was under severe discipline that held the men in check, but could not give the habit of war. In the one, the leaders were mostly over sixty; in the other mostly under forty. When they met, with Napoleon leading the French, there could be but one result.

In 1806 the Prussians made many mistakes, Napoleon made few. “No general, however great, escapes errors. The greatest is he who makes the fewest.” From the opening move to the end of the pursuit, it was one of Napoleon's masterpieces. The last of the Prussian army to surrender was gallant Blücher, who insisted on writing at the end of the document: “I capitulate because I have neither bread nor ammu-

nition." He lived to win a revenge game at Waterloo. Of all this the book treats intelligently.

Soldiers no longer monopolize military history. Of this Messrs. Ropes and O'Connor Morris were proof. Mr. Petre's style is direct and clear. He understands his authorities, relying mainly on Foucart, Hoepfner, Montb  , Lettow-Vorbeck, and the *Correspondence*. There are of course hundreds of other writers on 1806. At times he compares the authorities to advantage. His topographical descriptions are good—the comparison of the field of Jena to Dorking being certainly original. There is a short chapter on the Strategy and Tactics of the campaign, several plans and maps, and a number of portraits of the distinguished actors, mostly from Mr. Broadley's collection. The manufacture of the book is admirable. Taken together Mr. Petre has contributed two good volumes to military history.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

L'Elaboration de la Charte Constitutionnelle de 1814 (1^{er} Avril—4 Juin 1814). Par PIERRE SIMON, Licenci  -  es-lettres. (Paris : Edouard Corn  y et Cie. 1906. Pp. 181.)

INCLUDING the critical apparatus this valuable and interesting monograph, executed in the best French manner, may be described as falling into three parts, a description of the sources utilized, a narrative of the events which shape the formulation and promulgation of the charter, and a critical study of the text of that document.

The bibliography is altogether admirable. In organization, critical spirit, and exact description of the sources, it leaves little to be desired. The manuscript material drawn from the Archives Nationales and the archives of the ministry of foreign affairs is considerable in amount and value. A collection of documents upon the charter deposited at the Archives Nationales by the minister of justice in June, 1905, the papers of Beugnot, the *proc  s-verbaux* of the Senate, and the police bulletin of the period, are perhaps the most important. Since the newspapers of the day were but few in number and of slight value, while the numerous pamphlets are of use only to reflect public opinion, the author has been compelled to resort for his narrative of events principally to the memoirs of the leading participants, controlling them wherever possible by the use of strictly contemporaneous materials. In this way a cautious and discriminating use has been made of about all the memoirs of the time, especially those of Vitrolles, Beugnot, and Ferrand.

The narrative of the course of events which produced the charter is related from the constitutional standpoint alone and is confined almost exclusively to the period between the arrival of the allies at Paris and the promulgation of the charter two months later. In the main, it is a development of the thesis that at the overthrow of Napoleon there was a strong likelihood that the Bourbons would be forced to accept the decidedly liberal constitution formulated by the Senate and supported by Czar Alexander, but that the situation underwent the gradual change,